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Renewing the Community? Pork Barrelling? Maintaining the Status Quo?
What’s the Agenda?
K. Lavon Wright

Abstract
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina there are thousands of businesses in the City of
New Orleans closed. In an attempt to diminish financial loss, retain local
businesses, and attract investment the Mayor’s Office of Economic Development
initiated the process of amending HUD guidelines to fit the city’s current economic
status, and expand the existing Renewal Community boundaries to include the
entire city. Simultaneously, the state legislature in collaboration with the U.S.
Congress worked towards a more inclusive incentive package, the Gulf Opportunity
Zone. Analysis found in this paper gives increased evidence of communication
bottlenecks in federal government, and how decision making principles during a
time of crisis are unfortunately overlooked. Those most in need and with the most
time constraints and fewest resources become underrepresented. Pork barrelling
occurs, possibly “renewing communities not in need” or simply maintaining the
status quo.

Shifting Local Agenda

Pre-Katrina Social & Economic Climate
Whether rightfully labeled or wrongfully misjudged, both New Orleans and the
State of Louisiana are nationally viewed through the framework of the locality's heavily
malfeasant past. It could be argued that this perception has caused a decrease in private
investment and congressional influence which would aid the city in diminishing its
economic and social challenges.
With disregard to improved academic score reports in schools performing below
the state average due in part to superintendent-mandated changes in curriculum
instruction, the recently elected Superintendent Anthony Amato was asked by Orleans
Parish School Board to resign. It was said that “He failed to recognize the size and scope
of the system’s financial mess” (Gambit Weekly 2005). The improvement in test scores
must have been less important. Under scrutiny from the public and “themselves,” the
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School Board continued to flounder in stabilizing the school system’s finances after the
superintendent’s resignation and eventually lawmakers began calling for a state takeover
of the local special government once again (Gambit Weekly 2005).
Elected official misconduct and ineffective bureaucratic political initiatives are
widespread nationally and are not limited to Louisiana. Neither the local government nor
the state can be singled out for more federal investigations than several other states.
There have been consistent state probes into suspected political corruption in Chicago.
The latest being Mayor Richard M. Daley’s former patronage chief accused of ordering
the shredding of files and deleting of computer data, so as to keep it out of the hands of
federal investigators (Gambit Weekly 2005). San Diego’s acting Mayor Michael Zucchet
and Councilman Ralph Inzunza were both convicted on charges of wire fraud,
conspiracy, and extortion in July of 2005, and there are several other investigations into
civic contracts and affairs taking place nationally (Gambit Weekly 2005). However, it
should be acknowledged that within every stereotype is a sliver of truth. Both New
Orleans and Louisiana have a somewhat notorious reputation.
New Orleans was inundated with a stream of federal investigations in 2005 alone.
Federal agents raided the home of Jacques Morial in the French Quarter, brother of
former Mayor Marc Morial, and charged three individuals of stealing hundreds of
thousands of dollars from an $81 million city energy management contract signed by the
former mayor. Another associate of former Mayor Morial, Glenn Haydel, was charged in
August 2005 for wire fraud and money laundering with the Regional Transit Authority.
Shortly following Hurricane Katrina in October, Police Chief Eddie Compass resigned
after having four police officers cited for stealing 200 vehicles, 40 of which happened to
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be cadillacs, further decreasing regional and national sympathy and increasing cynicism
(Gambit Weekly 2005).
Before Hurricane Katrina and the displacing of the city’s 450,000 plus residents
with land space only measuring 181 square miles making the city the 31st largest city in
the country and the largest city in the state, New Orleans threatened to come in second
with the nation’s second worst homicide rate, most likely to end the year with a tally of
300 plus murders (Gambit Weekly 2005). Studies show that high crime rates are directly
linked to high unemployment and concentrated poverty. With 34.6% of households in
New Orleans occupying the bottom tier of the national income distribution and an 18%
poverty rate, the city was identified by the Brookings Institution as the sixth poorest city
of the top one hundred largest cities in 1999. The median household income in New
Orleans was one of the lowest, $35,317 in year 2000, placing the city 96th out of the one
hundred largest metropolitan areas (Berube and Tiffany 2004).
The Brookings Institute has six categories with similar measurements for
determining the degree to which income levels are equally distributed throughout a city
and mirror national income distribution. These categories are: balanced, divided, middleclass, higher-end, low-moderate, and stressed. In 1999 New Orleans was classified
“stressed,” having at a minimum twice as many households in the bottom two categories
combined (lower-middle and middle-income) as in the top two categories combined
(upper-middle and high-income).1 Between 1970 and 2000 total non-farm employment
grew 87% nationally, however, only a staggering 54% in the New Orleans metropolitan
statistical area (MSA). In 1970, the city had more than 60% of the metro area’s total
1

Cities considered stressed are places struggling with larger problems that include the long-term transition
away from a manufacturing dominated economy, extreme racial segregation, and migration out of the
northern U.S. to southern and western states.
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jobs, by 2000 that share had dropped to 42%. The city saw only a small 3% loss of jobs,
meanwhile employment in surrounding parishes grew phenomenally.

Neighboring

Jefferson parish, directly across New Orleans’ parish line, added 166,000 jobs (a 157%
gain), St. Tammany parish added 69,000 jobs (a 431% gain), and St. Charles parish
added 14,000 jobs (a 148% gain) (Brookings Institute October 2005). Conclusively, it
can be denounced that even before the havoc of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans was
growing slowly and facing challenges commonly accompanied with low incomes and
poverty (The Brookings Institution October 2005).
Pre- and Post-Storm Priorities
The chart below provides the city’s federal agenda before the wake of Hurricane
Katrina.

The agenda is project specific and has a high emphasis on scaling up

transportation and infrastructure. What is of particular immediacy is securing the city
from possible storm devastation, measured by the number of projects listed and the
estimated cost of completion regarding flood control, climate changes, wastewater
inflow, canal lock replacement, ecosystem restoration, and emergency response shelters.
Projects directly pertinent to protecting the city were of the highest priority, somewhat
equal to that of transportation projects. Seven projects were initiated for transportation
and storm protection, although the cost associated with transportation projects is higher,
approximately $1 billion in comparison to the $88 million request in flood control. This
does not necessarily correlate with higher or lower priority (City of New Orleans 2006).
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CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
Federal Priorities FY 2006 (PRE-KATRINA)
Appropriations: Grants/Requests
PROJECT

DESCRIPTION

Airport

Runway 10/28 (East/West) rehabilitation – No funding for this awarded in 05.
Project almost completed anyway.

Community Health
Center Project

Convert four existing child health clinics into family clinics to provide primary
care. (Requesting look-alike status).
Authorized Pillsbury as a look alike Clinic
Multimodal Transportation Project. Construction cost est. $270M; $135M would
be FTA New Start; would require 50/50 match; the Regional Transit Authority is
requesting $5M from the state for FY 06.
1) Carrollton Ave. (US 61 – US 90)
2) Holiday Dr. (Gen Meyer to DeGaulle)
3) Downman Rd. (Hayne to I 10)
Rebuild Desire streetcar line from N. Rampart Street in CBD to Bywater

RPC/RTA Airport
to CBD Light Rail
RPC Road Projects

RTA/Desire
Streetcar Line
RTA/Bus
Replacement/Lease
Maintenance
Program

Superdome
(Emergency
Response
Shelter/Plan)
SWB/SELA

SWB/SSERP/I&I

Union Passenger
Terminal

1) FTA Approp. request for federal share of bus lease/maintenance program.

2) FTA Approp. request for replacement of 85 buses that will exceed useful life in
2006
3) TEA-LU authorization for federal share for RTA lease maintenance program
for remaining years until 2010.
4 ) TEA-LU authorization to replace entire RTA bus fleet of 364 buses.
Feasibility study planning and design to retrofit Superdome to “refuge of last
resort”. (State has said does not want Dome used as a shelter of last resort)

Southeast La Urban Flood Control Project
President’s Budget - $10M House - $10 M
Seeking higher markup in Senate
A.) Funding through EPA for $10M for Wastewater Inflow & Infiltration project as
in past. B.) Amend previous authorization in WRDA and coordinate with
Jefferson Parish. Request for $3M for Corps of Engineers in Energy & Water.
1. Change language in 06 for FY04 app. for more flexibility – site planning &.
2. Ask for earmark funding for asbestos abatement & canopy replacement over
track. (rec’d 3 earmarks – one language, 2 funding)

Chicory Tariff

Climate
Stewardship Act
Coastal Aid

100% USTR carousel tariff on chicory for 5 years as retaliation for European
Union tariff on American meat products. Sent letter to eliminate tariff to delegation
members. (No Change)
New Orleans is most vulnerable to climate change according to Int’l Climate
Change Panel study. Letter sent to Senators to support. (Amendment Failed)
Need authorization and funding for complete LA Coastal Area Ecosystem
Restoration Plan. $1.28B is federal share of $1.9B project.
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Continued
PROJECT

DESCRIPTION
(Energy Bill-LA gets $540M over 4 yrs. $15 -17 M dedicated to Orleans Parish
for Coastal Restoration projects)

Federal City

Coordinating Federal City Concept. Want to ensure that BRAC analysts consider
federal city project in scoring our facilities. (Partially Successful l)

Homeland Security
Regional HQ

Encourage the Secretary to establish regional HQ, and choose N.O. as the most
strategic place for it in this region.
(Secretary not interested in Regional HQ)
New Orleans Jazz National Historical Park (authorized)
(City took no action)
Inner Harbor Navigation Canal Lock Replacement Project (Industrial Canal)

Jazz Park
Lock Project

Pres. Bill - $0 House Mark-up $9.38M ($11.250 M funded pre K; maybe more
avail in 3rd supp under “commercial navigation & other projects”)
NASA
Neighborhood 1
NFC

Renewal
Community

Michoud to be part of “To Mars & Beyond”.
(Successful)
Coordinates our relations with HUD/HANO on issues, funding
Maintain existing workforce (approx. 200) & keep NFC primary consolidation
point for E government/ Maintain Bill Language to market & expand cross
servicing activities of NFC; ensure back up center stays in Louisiana. (Some
progress: Language to market & expand cross servicing approved FY 06 Ag
Approp; Back up Center issue for LA alive; NFC got some new work but lost
some TSP jobs; most workers returning to LA post K; $35M in 3rd
supplemental; need $35M more in 2006)
Reform & refine existing law to incentivize business & create job opportunities
(Expansion to 13 new census tracts to be done by Secretary; City has proposed
that whole city be RC – legislative action needed)

S&WB
S&WB/Power Plant
Tax Credits for
Homeowners
Tri-Dyne Road
System

Regulatory Issues
Power Plant rehabilitation or replacement
(Waiting for SWB lead)
Amend Internal Revenue Code to coordinate the rehabilitation tax credit and the
low income housing tax credit. Congressman Jefferson is a co-author of HR 659.
(some provisions in GOAONE post K)
Test Tri-Dyne’s Pro-Active Roadway System on Pontchartrain Blvd. The $7M
project will reconstruct the roadway in a manner that can limit future maintenance
and street restoration costs. (Not funded)

Increasing individual and business tax incentives is included much lower on the
list. Aside from House Bill HR 659 to amend the Internal Revenue Code to coordinate
the rehabilitation and low income housing tax credit and the request to expand the
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Renewal Community into thirteen additional census tracts, there are not many projects
included which directly influence business development and individual citizen savings.
As expected, the city’s priorities shifted in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. There
are only eleven federal “requests”, compared to twenty-five “project” initiatives preKatrina. The requests are categorized under broader, more over-arching issues like
“housing,” “transportation,” and “sewer and water” which would fall under the direction
of specific departments in city government (i.e. Department of Public Works, Sewage &
Water Board). In contrast to the city’s pre-Katrina tax relief requests for individuals and
businesses, post-storm there is significantly more emphasis placed on both the public and
private sector for financial relief through loans and tax incentives.

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
Post Katrina Federal Agenda 2005
Requests
1) Lost Revenue Replacement
Operating Costs & Debt Service
S&WB/Power Plant
Lift 20% of entity’s budget limit; payment of
base salaries & overtime. Need cancellation
provision back.

6) Housing Agenda
1. Gap financing in CDBG
2. HOME Funds
3. Seed Capital
4. Liberty Bond Program
(residential)

2) Estimate of Major Capital Losses

7) Federal City / NSA
conveyance/DHS Regional HQ

(Local Streets $1.8B
Bldg & Rec Infra & Support $648 M $350M)
3) Hurricane Protection & Flood Control

8) Tax Relief

4) CBD to Airport (and to Baton Rouge)
Light Rail Project

9) Transportation

5) Parallel Requests from City related
agencies :
Airport
Regional Transit Authority
Sewerage & Water Board
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A specific look at the Orleans-Jefferson Parish Renewal Community (RC) shows
that before Katrina the city was requesting the expansion of the RC into only thirteen
census tracts. Post-Katrina the city placed on its agenda a request that the City of New
Orleans, in its entirety, be classified as a Renewal Community, amending legislation to
include 185 census tracts. The initiation of this request was made through the Mayor’s
Office of Economic Development.
For the purpose of this analysis, the Mayor’s Office of Economic Development’s
quest to expand the Renewal Community boundaries to include the entire City of New
Orleans is extracted from other initiatives and specifically explored, particularly focusing
on the decision-making strategies employed.

In The Trenches
I took a tour of areas in the city identified as being underdeveloped
and the department’s top potential industrial, warehouse, commercial corridor
priorities. There are 17 wards in the City of New Orleans. Out of the seventeen I
was specifically assigned to assist in the business development of the now
internationally famous Lower 9th Ward.
I took that tour on Friday, August 26th, boarded up windows with my
father on Saturday, joked with relatives about who should leave with who for the
“hurricane,” contemplated where the family should go, questioned whether hotel
reservations should be made, and reluctantly moved a few things from the
garage upstairs. This hurricane, as have many others, was seen as a forced
vacation. I remember a cousin jokingly talking loud in a colloquial dialect
asking, “Who havin’ the hurricane party?” He remained behind the carpools and
for nearly two weeks his whereabouts were unknown.

Local Government in Crisis (Two Months Post-Katrina)
Expectations for employees during the first two months after Katrina were
unclear, but it can be inferred that employees managed themselves in the same manner
post-Katrina that they would have pre-Katrina, with the same information processes and
established level of expected output. From the top ranking Assistant Director of the
Mayor’s Office of Economic Development (MOED) down to the intern, employee
assignments were mostly delegated with minimal expansion of administrative control.
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Facing unforeseen and unprecedented economic pitfalls led to the necessity for MOED to
reassess departmental objectives, staff expectations, organizational structure, protocol,
and phases of economic development. In mid-October a department meeting was held
and a revised departmental precedent was set. Figure 2.0 gives eight of ten selected
slides of MOED’s “Staff Precedent Presentation.”

Phases of Developm ent

G u id in g P rin c ip le s
¾ C o m m itm e n t to N e w O rle a n s

S TO R M

¾ T e a m w o rk
¾ F le x ib ility

RECOVERY

¾ L o n g H o u rs
¾ O p e n -M in d e d T h in k in g (O u t-o f-th e -B o x )

R E B U ILD

¾ N o S u rp ris e s
3

Current Departm ental Structure

4

Departm ental Functions
ECO N O MIC DEVELO P M EN T

DON
Business D evelopm ent

T eam M em ber

T eam M em ber

T eam M em ber

W orkforce Developm ent

Task 1

Task 1

Task 2

Task 2

Task 3

Task 3
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Departm ental G oals

Goal 1: A thriving and diverse New Orleans economy

G oal 1: A thriving and diverse N ew O rleans
econom y

OBJECTIVES
•

Bring back New Orleans businesses

G oal 2: A w ell-trained, diverse and highlypaid N ew O rleans workforce

•

Provide access to new contracting opportunities for New Orleans
businesses

•

Provide access to financial assistance to retain New Orleans businesses

•

Establish One-Stop Business Recovery Center to facilitate business needs
(e.g. permits, logistical and technical assistance)

•

Establish an Information Outreach Initiative
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Goal 2: A well-trained, diverse and highly-paid New
Orleans workforce
OBJECTIVES
•

Provide workforce assistance (e.g. training, housing, transportation, safety)

•

“Bring Back New Orleans W orkers” Initiative

9
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Similar in purpose to the existence of MOED pre-storm, the mission of the
department remained the same, “To Connect People and Businesses to Opportunities.”
This is to be achieved through the pursuit of achieving two goals. 1) Taking needed steps
to mold a thriving and diversified economy in New Orleans, and 2) Creating and
attracting a well-trained workforce with a diversified skill set.

Beginning with the

organization’s most pertinent resource, its employees, guiding work principles were
highlighted with the attempt of developing a work environment conducive to meeting the
city and its citizen’s new challenges. Although departmental structure is delineated
below the city’s phases of development, the departmental structure slide is directly linked
to employee protocol and departmental guiding principles. This relationship should have
been portrayed in the presentation. The Current Department Structure Diagram does not
realistically portray the department’s process of decision making and implementation.
There are twenty-two MOED employees post-Katrina, down from fifty-four employees
pre-Katrina. Surely, other organizational tiers under the Executive Director exist.
Departmental goals are grouped into two categories. Departmental functions are
grouped into two categories: Business and Workforce Development.

Departmental

Structure, if in line with Mayor’s Office of Economic Development’s mission and
overarching goals, could have had two distinct classifications under the executive
director, giving further understanding of the channels of implementation and protocol.
The organizational structure of MOED is pointed out because in the next sections,
the bearing of this design will be connected to the department’s decision making
processes.
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Renewing the Community?
… and Naïve Inexperienced Student asked, “If we provide the Expansion for
Request document with all signatures on it before January 1st can we accept
CRD applications from businesses in the soon-to-be expanded area?” “Well, if
New Orleans can get the document signed and mailed to D.C. before January
1st then yes, but you still have to have all CRDs approved by the state before
the first as well. I’m sure theres a lot of businesses out there right now that
need the help,” said Washington Mandate Bureaucrat. “Ambitious. We might
need to wait till next year to issue CRDs. What applicants do you have? I
don’t think they’re eligible. It’s too late,” said Local Veteran Director.

Background
The Renewal Community (RC) is a Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) initiative inaugurated under the Community Renewal Tax Relief
Act of 2000 (CRTR Act). Viewed as an additional business incentive to pre-existing
Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities, classification as a Renewal
Community provides a specific urban or rural area additional tax grants, loans, and
technical assistance. Through public and private partnerships communities with high
unemployment and poverty rates and in perpetual economic decline are given incentives
to attract necessary investment to spur sustainable private economic development (HUD
2006).
The CRTR Act authorized the designation of nine additional Empowerment
Zones totaling one hundred thirty-four and forty Renewal Communities. These federally
targeted areas for community development were segregated from their surrounding
communities to benefit from a tax incentive package worth $11 billion. By providing tax
credits and deductions to businesses in the Renewal Community who hire employees who
live within the RC and/or may be identified as being in a target group, businesses are
encouraged to invest tax savings in hiring more employees, purchasing additional
equipment, and making facility renovations.

There are doubts as to whether the
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Orleans/Jefferson RC has maximized its use of tax provisions and whether the initiative
has been successful.

By HUD’s standards it probably has not been measurably

successful. Designation as a RC mandates that HUD performance reports (PERMS) be
completed on an annual basis. The reports are meant to assist individual RCs in crafting
clear goals, objectives and output measurements to gauge the program’s success on a
local level, as well as provide HUD with a sense for the Community Renewal Tax Act’s
overall business impact. By assessing performance reports, HUD is also able to provide
suggestions to CORAs (Coordinating Regional Authorities) to further assist in the
development of RCs by maximizing the use of all tax provisions.
Although the Orleans/Jefferson CORA was established in 2002 and PERMS
reports are to be submitted annually, this was not done. Only one PERMS report had
been submitted to HUD by November 2005 for the year 2002. MOED was informed of
this in November and asked to submit the report for 2003 soon, so as to begin completing
the annual report for 2004. With a file cabinet half-full of unorganized files, cumulative
data was insufficient. Suffice it to say that the PERMS reports eventually submitted,
three years late, were “hypothesized” educated guesses made through surface level
observation.

Lack of self-performance measurement from the past RC Director in

MOED, and the inability of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to discern between
community programs that provide varied amounts of wage credits (i.e. Enterprise and
HUB zones), make gauging the Orleans/Jefferson RC’s success cumulatively inaccurate.

12

Renewal Community Business Incentives:
Employee Hiring Provisions
Wage Credit

Work Opportunity Tax Credit

Welfare to Work Credit

Up to $1,500 or 15% of any
employee’s salary up to $10,000
for each employee who lives and
works in the renewal community.

Up to $2,400 for employees hired
from groups that have high
unemployment rates or other
special employment needs,
including youth ages 18 to 24 that
live in the renewal community.
Other qualified groups include
veterans, ex-felons, food stamp
recipients, vocational rehabilitation
referrals and summer youth.

Up to $3,500 for the first year and
$5000 for the second year for
each new hire of someone on
long-term family assistance.

Property
Acquisition/Revitalization
Provision
Commercial Revitalization Deduction

Allows businesses that construct or
rehabilitate commercial property to
deduct a portion of the costs over a
shorter period of time than
permitted under standard
depreciation rules.

Environmental Clean up Cost
Deduction

Allows businesses looking for land
to deduct clean up costs of
hazardous substances in qualified
areas.

Zero Percent Capital Gains Rate

A business that holds an asset for
at least five years does not have to
pay taxes on the profit of its sale.

Low-income Housing
Credit
Ten year credit for
owners of newly
constructed or renovated
rental housing who set
aside a number of units
for low-income
residents. The State must
allocate a portion of its
annual cap.

Equipment Purchase Provision
Increased Section 179 Deduction

Allows businesses to take a
deduction of up to $35,000 on
equipment purchases. That lets
businesses deduct all or part of the
equipment cost the year it is
purchased instead of deducting the
expense over time.

Investor Provisions
New Markets Tax Credit

Investors in qualified projects can
obtain a tax credit of 5 to 6 percent
of the amount invested for each of
the years the investment is held, for
up to seven years of the credit
period.

In regards to employee hiring provisions given through RC wage credits, Work
Opportunity Tax Credits (WOTC), zero percent capital gains attainment on property held
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for a minimum of five years, and increased section 179 deductions for equipment
purchase, there is not a federal mechanism yet in place to cumulatively determine
whether the Renewal Community incentive package in and of itself independent of
external factors assists the business community in impoverished areas. The Internal
Revenue Service does not differentiate tax credits and deductions given to businesses in
the Renewal Community from those given in Empowerment/Enterprise/HUB Zones.
Outside of inquiring from local businesses how much they saved by filing for these
incentives at the end of each tax season, Renewal Community incentives for hiring,
purchasing equipment, and saving when selling property with the zero percent capital
gains rate is not cumulatively captured, and therefore the argument that HUD’s Renewal
Community initiative for impoverished communities attracts, retains and scales up
existing businesses lacks sufficient evidence.
Files for commercial revitalization deductions (CRDs) on a local, state and federal
level are better maintained. CRDs allow businesses to accelerate their cost for renovation
expenditures more rapidly. Businesses in the RC can opt to deduct renovation costs from
their federal taxes over the course of ten or thirty-nine years. This provision assists
business owners with their bottom-line by cutting their tax debt and allowing them to
keep more money in their pocket, enabling them to re-invest in their business at an
accelerated pace.
Twelve million dollars worth of CRDs are allotted to each of the four RCs in
Louisiana. The Orleans/Jefferson RC has never allocated its full amount of CRDs in any
given year since the program’s inauguration in 2002. The downside to the RC’s inability
to do so means a loss of potential business revitalization that can not roll over and be
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allocated in subsequent years. Whatever money is not allocated is lost. Beginning in
2003, out of $12 million, the Orleans/Jefferson RC allocated $5 million, and in 2004, $7
million. As of August 2005, pre-Katrina, no monies had been allotted to any business
owners for business revitalization in the RC. MOED’s deadline for delivering business
applications to the state Department of Economic Development (LED) was October 1,
2005.
Based on evidence provided in this report a concluding thought would be that the
Orleans-Jefferson Urban Parish RC pre-Katrina lacked credibility in “renewing the
community.” There is no clear way to tell whether the federal initiative, of course
implemented at a local level, had a significant if any impact on the community with its
designation, if even at all, the evidence points in the direction that the RC designation has
not had the positive impact on the community intended. There is no way to justify that
businesses which decided to open there, remain there, hired more employees, or
purchased better equipment did so because of knowledge of RC tax benefits. Even with
the allocation of commercial revitalization deductions, the question arises as whether the
CRD allocations had any tantamount bearing on the business’ choice to re-invest and
rehabilitate property. It may also simply be too early to determine MOED’s success with
the initiative.
Mistakes in RC Inauguration & Expansion
Renewal Community designations are spearheaded at the local level and
acknowledged by HUD only after local governments have submitted completed
applications. Based on what the local government submits, the community is assessed
for meeting HUD RC requirements and granted RC designation. The Mayor’s Office of
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Economic Development (MOED) led the Renewal Community inauguration initiative
and presented six census tracts in Orleans parish and one in Jefferson parish to HUD. In
2002, the two parishes were identified as meeting HUD’s population, poverty and
unemployment formula for designation as a Renewal Community based on the data of
seven locally submitted and federally qualified census tracts.
What was not realized until 2005 pre-Katrina was that MOED had mistakenly
omitted six census tracts which would have qualified in 2002, but no longer qualified in
2005. These census tracts were 5800, 5900, 6000, 8400, 8500, and 8600. This omission
was realized when the former RC director began the process of amending RC boundaries
to include sixteen additional census tracts.2 Only thirteen of nineteen requested census
tracts were accepted by HUD on the premise that the above six census tracts had lower
unemployment and poverty rates in 2000 than in 1990, showing an “improvement.” If
MOED had requested the six census tracts in addition to the original seven initially, the
total number of census tracts classified as an RC at the time of inauguration in 2002
would have thirteen, not only seven.

A local government can request that a RC’s

boundaries be expanded at any time, but must meet the requirement of showing increases
in poverty and unemployment, irregardless of whether the two statistics meet the
threshold of 9.4% unemployment and 20% poverty.

2

Every census tract included in the RC means more businesses having the advantage of saving and reinvesting in their businesses and thus the community.
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It was however found that although MOED’s request to have census tracts 5800,
5900, 6000, 8400, 8500, 8600 be included in the RC was denied, census tracts 4401,
4900, 5000, 6400, 6500, 9400, 10300, 11200, 11900, 12101, 12102, 12300, and 12600
showed an increase in unemployment and poverty and met HUD’s requirement of having
a minimum of 9.4% rate of unemployment and poverty rate of 20%. These tracts could
therefore be included in the RC boundary. MOED rejected 11900, 12101, 12102, and
12600 as HUD qualified and proposed additions on the grounds that the areas HUD was
identifying as impoverished were anything but poor and underdeveloped. Many students
lived in the area and attended well-known private institutions (Loyola and Tulane
University), the housing there did not appear dilapidated, and furthermore was located
adjacent in the city’s Garden District, an area known for being “well-to-do.”
It was determined by MOED that amending the RC boundary to include those
four census tracts would increase political tension between city council members and thus
their districts. MOED feared that a decision to include those census tracts would be
viewed by the public as being a “conspiracy” to enrich the rich and ignore the poor.
However, this decision to not accept the three HUD approved census tracts based on
potential political tension was held pre-Katrina 2005.
Expansion of the Renewal Community
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, MOED pushed for the expansion of the
Renewal Community designation. The Director of MOED delegated the task of 1)
expanding the RC boundary to include thirteen additional census tracts based on current
HUD guidelines and 2) identifying all census tracts which would have qualified for RC
classification originally based on 1990 data, submitting this data to HUD and ask that
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they be flexible and despite their guidelines not compare 1990 data to 2000 data, and 3)
facilitating discussion and garnering support needed to congressionally amend HUD
guidelines so that all of New Orleans could be classified as a RC on the grounds that the
RC initiative be amended to designate RC status to communities based on their most
current statistics, not those of 1990 or 2000 (U.S. Census ten year reports), which may
not delineate an accurate picture of the community’s economy.
While targeting these three goals, an intern included the goal of allocating $12
million in Commercial Revitalization Deductions (CRDs) to businesses in both the
existing and soon-to-be expanded RC based on HUD’s current guidelines.

Within

thirteen business days, $11.1 million in CRD allocation applications were submitted to
the state, meeting the deadline for December 30, 2005 that had been extended from
October 1, 2005 due to Hurricane Katrina.

2005
2003

Ye Olde
College Inn
Critical Care
Car Wash
Five Happiness
Restaurant
Carl E.
Woodward LLC

Total

2002

Carrolton
Shopping Plaza

Company Name CRD Amount
$442,209.64
$514,029.99
$307,378.94
$2,400,000
$3,663,618.57

$7,087,505

Helm Paint & Supply
Popeyes Chicken &
Biscuits
La Strada Inn, Inc.
Security Iron Co., Inc.
Morphy, Makofsky
Bayou Coffee House
Delta World Tire Co.
French Riviera Spa
Elgee Uniforms
Duplain W. Rhodes
Funeral Home
Rhodes Commercial
Dev. LLC
Oliver H. Van Horn
Co., LLC
Total

$1,700,000
$196,600
$750,000
$458,550
$419,732
$75,588
$300,000
$61,464
$59,421
$1,700,000
$4,500,000
$900,064
$11,121,419
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Under current HUD guidelines a designated Renewal Community must meet the
geographic, population, and economic condition requirements for expansion into other
census tracts (HUD 2006). The guidelines are the following:
•
•
•
•

Every amended RC must have a contiguous boundary
The amended RC must maintain a population of no more than 200,000
Each census tract must have a poverty rate of at least 20%, and must be higher in
2000 than in 1990
Also, HUD will confirm that in each of the requested amended census tracts that
the unemployment rate is at least 9.4%, and is higher in 2000 than in 1990
Only a small portion of New Orleans qualified as a RC, approximately .02% of

the city’s land mass with nearly 60 small businesses post-katrina, amounting to 30% of
the city’s 1,800 businesses re-opened post-Katrina. The entire RC received flood waters
as low as 3 ft. to as high as 7 ft. from Hurricane Katrina (FEMA 2005).
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Post-Katrina 2005, MOED made the argument with HUD again that they would
be willing to lose out on census tracts 11900, 12101, 12102, and 12600 in exchange for
census tracts 5800, 5900, 6000, 6800, 8400, 8500, and 8600 which not only visibly
showed signs of poverty, despite U.S. Census data that the area had decreased in
unemployment and poverty, but would house some of the city’s major economic
development initiatives. These initiatives were the Biomedical District and Hollywood
South.

HUD immediately stated that doing so would necessitate congressional

amendment, and could not be handled in-house on HUD’s administrative level. HUD
also gave MOED the heads up on what was happening within the department’s own state
legislature and Congress. Through a series of conference calls HUD explained a bill that
was in the process of being passed to decrease the tax burden of businesses in the Gulf
Coast.
Focusing solely on the desire of having HUD take actions which it did not have
the power to take and classify three non-qualifying census tracts as a part of the RC, in
addition to requesting that HUD assist the city in its entirety be designated as an RC,
MOED continued in its pursuit of writing letters to congressmen and top HUD
bureaucrats to support its wishes, ignoring the oncoming of the Gulf Opportunity Zone
Act of 2005 (GO Zone). Ultimately, despite time and energy invested MOED was only
allowed to include the areas which HUD had initially pre-determined for eligibility based
on their current guidelines, and had missed any opportunity to have input in the crafting
of the GO Zone bill.
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Gulf Opportunity Zone
“What was that? What are they talking about? Thirty-one parishes in
Louisiana all getting tax incentives…You know this mayor in Baton Rouge is
really beginning to piss me off! What the hell does he mean – he wants to
make sure East Baton Rouge, of all places, is gonna’ get its cut? He’s got extra
expenses from the increase in his population? What!? He’s getting all da’
extra sales tax from all the people living up there that used to live down here...
I’ll tell ya’ guys. Excuse my language ladies… but… Jefferson parish is
gonna’ kick you’re a*#.”
-Small business owner in New Orleans speaking to Director of MOED

GO Zone’s Purpose
On September 16, 2005 in a televised address in the historic French Quarter of
New Orleans at Jackson Square, President Bush outlined his plans to the nation to assist
in the Gulf Coast’s recovery efforts and to prevent bureaucratic errors like those which
had slowed the response to Hurricane Katrina. In the president’s plan to ameliorate the
region in the aftermath of the most destructive hurricane ever (according to the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) he proposed among other key initiatives the
creation of a Gulf Opportunity Zone (CNN 2005).
The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 H.R. 4440 (P.L. 109-155) was signed by
the President three months later on December 21, 2005 while MOED worked expediently
to have New Orleans, alone, classified as a Renewal Community for non-inexplicable
reasons. MOED was not in sync with state governing entities. For well-defined areas of
the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama state and federal legislators decided to
provide immediate help on taxes, housing, education, and job training for the victims of
Katrina. Only areas defined as that portion of hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita as
Core Disaster Areas determined by the President to warrant assistance under the Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act are included in the GO Zone. Communities within
the zone are provided incentives for the purpose of creating jobs, providing tax relief for
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small businesses, and loans and loan guarantees for small businesses which would
include those which are minority-owned (LA GO Zone Business Guide 2006).
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Gulf Opportunity Zone Provisions
Tax-Emempt Bond Financing
Present an opportunity for private business owners and corporations to borrow capital at very
favorable tax-exempt rates to acquire, construct, reconstruct or renovate non-residential real
property, qualified residential rental projects, and public utility property in the GO Zone.
Restricted to governmental agencies, qualified private activity bonds, or not-for-profit organizations.
These restrictions on tax-exempt debt have been modified by Congress in the GO Zone to allow
private business owners and corporations the advantage for a limited time.
Interest on these GO Zone bonds will be exempt from both federal and state income taxes and will be
exempt from inclusion in the federal Alternative Minimum Tax; therefore, the interest rates will be
significantly lower (as much as 1.5% to 2%) than rates available through conventional financing.
Bonus Deprectiation
Taxpayers are now allowed an additional depreciation deduction equal to 50% of the depreciable basis
of qualified GO Zone property for the first year the property is placed in service.
Qualified property includes: Tangible personal property, computer software other than software that
would be amortized over 15 years, water/utility property, qualified leasehold improvement property,
non-residential real property, residential real property.
Increased Section 179 Expensing
Under the GO Zone Act, the $108,000 maximum amount that a taxpayer may elect to deduct under
Section 179 in 2006 and 2007 is increased by the lesser of $100,000 or the cost of qualified Section
179 GO Zone property placed in service during the taxable year.
The $430,000 phase-out ceiling for this benefit is also raised substantially to $1,030,000.

Enhanced Net Operating Loss Carryback
A net operating loss is the amount by which a taxpayer's allowable deductions exceed the taxpayer's
gross income. In general, a NOL may be carried back in the GO Zone five years instead of only two
years and carried forward 20 years to offset taxable income in such years.

Increased Tax Credit for Rehabilitation Expenditures
The amount of rehabilitation tax credits is increased from 20% to 26% for historic buildings and from
10% to 13% for buildings placed in service before 1936, for any certified structure or qualified
rehabilitated building located in the GO Zone.

Clean-up, Remediatation, and Timber Reforestation Costs
Taxpayers in a trade or business may claim a 50% deduction for costs paid or incurred in the GO Zone
on or after Aug. 28, 2005, and before Jan. 1, 2008, to clean up and remove debris from real property
or to demolish structures.
In dealing with hurricane losses, the cleanup cost and adjusted basis of the structure that was
damaged can be used in computing the casualty loss caused by the storms.

Enhancement of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits
The GO Zone Act provides for a greater allocation of low-income housing tax credits for the affected
areas, increases the number of persons that qualify as low-income, and increases the amount of
financing that results from using the credit. These liberalizations make building in the GO Zone more
attractive to investors both in terms of the amount of the credit available and the threshold for
poverty that tenants must meet.
Gozoneguide.com
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Gulf Opportunity Zone Provisions
Tax Credits for Employers
The GO Zone Act extends many of the provisions in KETRA to the Rita GO Zone, including the new
Employee Retention Tax Credit and KETRA's enhancement of the Work Opportunity Tax Credit. And
while the primary emphasis of KETRA was on tax relief for individuals, Congress recognized that the
individual tax relief would be beneficial to many small businesses, whose owners were turning to
personal savings and credit in an effort to help workers and save their businesses.
Work Opportunity Tax Credit
KETRA provided a new targeted group, which is "Hurricane Katrina employees." This group consists
of individuals whose "principal abode" as of Aug. 28, 2005, was in the core disaster area.
For purposes of calculation of the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, for employees who work more than
400 hours, the credit will equal 40% of their first year's qualified wages not in excess of $6,000. For
employees who work equal to or less than 400 hours but more than 120 hours, the credit equals
25% of their first year qualified wages not in excess of $6,000.
If the employer is located outside the core disaster area, they must have hired the qualifying
employee by Dec. 31, 2005. If the employer is located within the core disaster area, they will have
two years from Aug. 28, 2005, to hire a Hurricane Katrina employee and qualify for the credit.
Employee Retention Credit
New to the tax law is an income tax credit for "eligible employers" who continued to pay employees
during the period their business was inoperable between Aug. 27 and Dec. 31, 2005, as a result of
damage sustained by hurricanes Katrina, Wilma or Rita. This credit is calculated on 40% of the
qualified wages paid to each eligible employee up to $6,000 of wages.
Personal Casualty Losses
For many years, most taxpayers have not been able to benefit from these provisions because of two
specific limitations. First, the casualty loss amount had to exceed $100, and second, the amount
deductible was further limited by an amount equal to 10% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income.
KETRA has changed this by removing the two limitations on any losses that arose from hurricanes
Katrina, Wilma or Rita on or after Aug. 24, 2005, in the disaster area.
Since this was a presidentially declared disaster, the casualty losses incurred after Aug. 25, 2005,
can be reported on either the 2005 individual return or the taxpayer can elect to report the loss in
the year immediately preceding the taxable year, 2004.
New Market Tax Credits
The NMTC Program permits individual and corporate taxpayers to receive a credit against federal
income taxes for making qualified equity investments in investment vehicles known as Community
Development Entities (CDEs).
Treasury's CDFI Fund has combined the 2005 and 2006 amounts and thus will allocate an additional
$600 million of NMTC authority for specific use in the GO Zone in 2006. This is in addition to the
previously announced allocation authority for the NMTC program of $3.5 billion annually for 2006 and
2007.
Gozoneguide.com
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The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 began as the second stage of tax relief for
the Gulf Coast. The first incentive package was administered through KETRA P.L. 10973 (Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005), and provided for only those in the Gulf
region affected by Hurricane Katrina. KETRA grew into the larger bill (GO Zone) after
the oncoming of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma, bestowing federal tax and loan assistance to
an increased number of citizens and businesses in the region (News Channel 5 on Your
Side 2006). The GO Zone consists of the following principal elements:
The GO Zone has only received minimal criticism mostly pertaining to tax writeoffs provided to gambling casinos amounting to millions of dollars in savings, though
possibly more attention should have been placed on the overtly inclusiveness of the GO
Zone’s boundaries (Weisman Sept. 2005).
The GO Zone “Pork” Package
In a very different tone than previous Gulf Coast incentive packages White House
officials in the very early stages of the GO Zone’s proposal intended to include the
gaming industry in the list of industries eligible for receiving tax breaks regarding
investment in equipment and structure. This intention was welcomed and endorsed by
the gaming industry of course and Mississippi’s Governor Haley Barbour (Weisman
Sept. 2005).

The necessity to grant incentives to the gaming industry of Mississippi, in
particular, had not been needed in the past, and some economic experts in the state still
contend that the industry can do very well and bounce back from 2005’s hurricane season
without them. An economist at the University of Mississippi, William F. Shughart II,
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vocally acknowledged that even if the casinos were eligible, providing such tax hand-outs
to them would be a waste of money.

This example of the indiscriminate nature of the president’s proposal welcomed
by Governor Barbour sharpened criticism in Congress of the federal administration’s
rebuilding effort. Sen. Max Baucus (Mont.), the ranking Democrat on the Senate Finance
Committee, recommended a day after the GO Zone proposal that a panel convene factfinding hearings to examine how many properties are insured and what incentives
different industries need to rebuild. Conducting such research would surely decrease the
amount of wasted, yet desperately needed federal revenue which could be returned to
disaster areas and disbursed for recovery in infinite ways. Federal tax revenues generated
from gaming could potentially be reallocated to qualifying community development
entities or given in community development block grants to discriminately renew
hurricane disaster areas with the greatest need within the gaming businesses’ state. A
senior Republican tax aide on the committee commented on the fact that existing
legislation creating similar tax-favored zones excludes gambling facilities as well as golf
courses, country clubs, massage parlors, tanning salons, hot tub facilities and liquor
stores. The tax aide attributed tax legislation being written this way to past political
reluctance to subsidize unpopular industries as well as the understanding that businesses
“like gambling simply do not need such support” (Weisman 2005). The latter part of the
quote is most pertinent. Why provide tax incentives or assistance to industries which
demonstrate resilience and the ability to profit in the aftermath of 2005’s hurricane
season while they continue to create jobs, train their employees, purchase equipment, and
make costly renovations independently? The money should go elsewhere.
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Both Republicans and Democrats have admonished the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's $5 billion effort to purchase 300,000 trailers and mobile homes,
despite record-low apartment occupancy rates in states just beyond Katrina's reach.
Democrats also moved to repeal Bush's suspension of federal wage supports, which
require federal contractors to pay workers prevailing local wages, on federally financed
construction projects in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and lightly affected South
Florida. Dozens of House Republicans have proposed significant spending cuts -- many
of them on signature Bush programs -- to finance hurricane relief.

"What Hurricane Katrina destroyed in hours will take years to rebuild," Baucus
(D) said. "The public expects the government to be careful with taxpayer dollars and put
them to use in a smart and practical manner" (2005). White House spokesman Trent
Duffy (R) said, “The federal government should not be picking which businesses should
or should not rebuild. The emphasis of tax incentives should be to get people back to
work, he said, and that means rebuilding structures as fast as possible” (2005). The
argument is not which businesses should be rebuilt, but which businesses and
communities need “government assistance” to rebuild, and to what extent.

Determined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to be
eligible for individual and/or public assistance from the federal government, the
Louisiana GO Zone covers thirty-one parishes identified by FEMA as Core Disaster
Areas. The parishes include: Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Calcasieu, Cameron, East
Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette,
Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines, Pointe Coupee, St. Bernard, St. Charles,
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St. Helena, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Martin, St. Mary, St. Tammany,
Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Vermilion, Washington, West Baton Rouge and West Feliciana
(FEMA 2005).

The Congressional Research Service estimates that 700,000 or more people have
been significantly impacted by Hurricane Katrina, due to residing in areas that flooded or
sustained significant structural damage. With an estimated 77% of Orleans’ population
affected, and nearly all residents of St. Bernard, the CRS analysis shows that Orleans and
St. Bernard parish in Louisiana were disproportionately harder hit by flooding,
amounting to approximately half of the individuals displaced by the hurricane to have
lived specifically in New Orleans. With a combined population of 2.5 million people,
only sixteen counties are reported to have received some flooding and/or structural
damage based on FEMA flood and damage assessments, however thirty-one parishes are
identified by FEMA as being in the Core Disaster Area and have been given equal access
to tax provisions found in the GO Zone.

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act authorizes
a range of federal aid for states, localities, and households in the event of a federally
declared major disaster. There are two major categories of assistance: Public assistance
which encompasses various forms of aid to state and local governments and some
nonprofit organizations, and federal assistance to individuals and households (Gabe, Falk
and McCarty 2005). The Stafford Act provides presidential discretion in designating
areas as eligible for disaster aid, however, regulations include the following factors for
considering whether individual and household assistance should be available in an area:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Concentration of damage
Degree of trauma to a state and communities
Special populations
Extent to which state and local or voluntary agencies can meet needs
Amount of insurance coverage in an area
Amount of individual assistance provided by the state

Ultimately, the Stafford Act considers large numbers of injuries or deaths, large
scale disruptions of normal community functions, and emergency needs such as extended
or widespread loss of power, and whether the disaster area includes low-income, elderly
or unemployed persons.

On the 1 to 5 Saffir-Simpson scale Hurricane Katrina was a midlevel Category 3
at the time of landfall. The storm’s barometric pressure was 902 millibars (mb), the sixth
lowest ever recorded, but still higher than Hurricanes Wilma (882 mb) and Rita (897 mb).
At Katrina’s peak after making landfall it sustained a wind speed of 125 mph. 55 miles
south of New Orleans. By the time the storm touched down in the Big Easy, wind speeds
barely reached “hurricane” defined strength, however, it is noted that Katrina’s winds are
still ranked the eighth strongest winds of all hurricanes recorded at landfall.

The

magazine, Popular Mechanics, called Katrina “a large but typical hurricane.” Sweeping
across 250 mi. of coastline, pushing forward an unusually severe storm surge reaching
over 30 ft. in some low lying areas, begirding three states, and traveling more than 100
mi. inland, the storm devastated communities primarily to its east (Popular Mechanics
March 2006).

So then a crucial question is developed from the argument that “businesses should
be rebuilt, but only a select group of businesses and communities need government
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assistance to rebuild, and to a determined extent.” Did destruction inflicted upon thirtyone parishes in the State of Louisiana necessitate them all having access to business
assistance pieces of GO Zone legislation?

Katrina Damage Assessment
When the GO Zone legislation was written thirty-one parishes listed in FEMA’s
core disaster area in Louisiana are entitled to the following business incentives:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Bonus Depreciation
Increased Section 179 Expensing
Enhanced Net Operating Loss Carryback
Increased Tax Credit for Rehabilitation Expenditures
Cleanup, Remediation, & Timber Reforestation Costs
Enhancement of Low-income Housing Tax Credits
Worker Opportunity Tax Credit
Employee Retention Credit

When President Bush spoke to the nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans on
December 21, 2005 he re-stated that “our job and our goal for the Gulf Coast was not to
survive, but to thrive, and not just to cope, but to overcome” (The White House Dec.
2005).

Looking at maps showing where the highest rainfall fell, where the worst

flooding occurred, where the strongest winds blew, it appears that the thirty-one parishes
included in the GO Zone did not all experience severe winds, destructive rainfall, and
flooding. Finding qualitative and quantitative data to support a claim for several parishes
that they experienced large amounts of devastation is difficult. It is suspect whether these
hardly scathed parishes should benefit from business tax incentives intended to assist
local businesses through tax savings and the attraction of new investment.

These

eighteen suspect parishes are: Acadia, East Baton Rouge, West Baton Rouge, East
Feliciana, Assumption, Ascension, St. James, Iberville, Jefferson-Davis, Sabine, Allen,
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Lafayette, Evangeline, Livingston, Point Coupee, St. John the Baptist, St. Martin, and
Washington.3

FEMA’s damage assessment is characterized by several damage categories
classified under two sectors:

Structural Damage
•
•
•
•

Catastrophic Damage: Most solid and all light or mobile structures are
destroyed
Extensive Damage: Some solid structures are destroyed; most sustain exterior
and interior damage (e.g. roofs are missing, interior walls exposed), most mobile
homes and light structures are destroyed
Moderate Damage: Solid structures sustain exterior damage (e.g. missing roofs
or roof segments); some mobile homes and light structures are destroyed, many
are damaged and displaced
Limited Damage: Generally superficial damage to solid structures (e.g. loss of
tiles or roof shingles; some mobile homes and light structures are damaged or
displaced
Flood/water Damage

•
•

Flood: Indicates a separate severe damage category related to the specific effects
of flooding
Saturated Area: Indicates the possibility of water damage due to saturated soil.
CRS estimates that more than 700,000 people lived in neighborhoods that either

experienced catastrophic, extensive, or moderate flooding or structural damage
throughout the three Gulf states. Approximately 657,000 people lived in areas that were
flooded. This accounts for more than 90% of individuals most acutely impacted by the
storm. Approximately 26% also lived in areas with either catastrophic, extensive, or
moderate structural damage. 54,000 people lived in non-flooded areas impacted by

3

These parishes do not exhibit extensive or catastrophic damage from either Katrina or Rita. A few of
these parishes do not exhibit mild damage.
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catastrophic, extensive, or moderate wind and/or surging water. 97% of the total affected
population resided in Louisiana (Gabe, Falk and McCarty 2005).

Flood waters by far were the most destructive force from nature. Three-quarters
of Orleans’ parish population is estimated to have been affected by flood waters, half of
Plaquemines parish (south east of New Orleans), two-fifths of Jefferson parish (directly
west and south of New Orleans), and for the most part, all of St. Bernard Parish (97% of
its entire population, located directly south-east of New Orleans.

Conclusively, in

Louisiana, Orleans parish accounted for the majority of the state’s population impacted
by extensive damage (Gabe, Falk and McCarty 2005).

It can be concluded that these three areas having a disproportionate amount of
affected individuals in comparison to the other “core disaster areas,” should have
received a business tax incentive package far greater than that given in the GO Zone to all
thirty-one core disaster classified areas; or the fifteen “suspect” parishes mentioned
previously should have been excluded from receiving tax provisions. The maps and
tables below provide further credence to the GO Zone being overly inclusive and
unnecessarily made accessible to several counties, though business insurance claims
would further validate this argument.4 The attraction and appeal of the GO Zone to
potential investors to heavily affected areas has been compromised.

One can see from looking at the maps below that only the extreme south east of
the state received heavy winds, which are noted by Popular Mechanics as “barely
reaching hurricane strength” after making landfall. Rainfall from Katrina only measured
4

Insurance claims have not yet been provided to the public for hurricane affected parishes.
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over a foot in approximately fifteen parishes and Katrina is noted as a worse hurricane
than both Wilma and Rita.5 If viewing a FEMA map one finds very little mile, extensive,
or catastrophic damage outside those parishes bordering New Orleans and the very
bottom of the state’s coastline.6

5

Rainfall amounts for Hurricane Katrina were not the primary impact of the storm.

6

Totals are incomplete due to storm damage experienced at many stations along the immediate Gulf coast.
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Population affected by flooding or structural
damage
Selected
Parishes
Jefferson
Lafource
Livingston
Orleans
Plaquemines
St. Bernard
St. Charles
St. Tammany
Tangipahoa

Total population in
selected parishes
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

Total
40.8
0.1
0
77.1
48.8
96.9
1.4
3.5
0

Flooding
39.7
0
0
76.8
42.4
96.6
1.3
2.4
0

Whether state legislators decided to roll out GO Zone boundaries on a “if you ask,
we’ll supply basis,” or chose to request as much from Congress as they could; thinking
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the more the state received the better without concerning themselves with being overly
inclusive, the boundaries defined in the GO Zone have led to those communities not in
need overshadowing those in need of business retention, development, and savings. Nondevastated GO Zone communities have become ideal places to relocate or remain in if a
business had post-Katrina chosen to relocate its operations there while waiting to return
to it’s pre-Katrina community. The incentives intended to attract investment more easily
are detoured off the path of locating in communities most heavily devastated and are
actually given incentives to pursue entrepreneurship in communities which at this time
are not in need because they all have access to the same GO Zone incentive package.
This issue directly fuels interstate competition, but unfortunately automatically places
heavily devastated communities not unlike New Orleans, St. Bernard, St. Tammany, and
Plaquemines parish in a compromised and competitively inferior position.

Whether the GO Zone was purposefully issued as pork to surrounding parishes, or
as is normally expected, the federal and state government pushed forth a bill simply filled
with waste can both be examined. This legislation with broad boundaries resulted in the
state of Louisiana losing the advantage of creating concentrated investment in the most
needed communities, which by and large happen to generate the state’s largest sales tax
base, oil refineries, and fisheries. The state’s agenda, just what they were trying to
accomplish is blurry; however, it can be estimated that legislatures were trying to get as
much as they could, in the fastest, least controversial way, jeopardizing 1) the social
contract between communities most in need and government’s redistributive role, and 2)
the ability to attract and sustain incrementally planned, concentrated, economic
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investment in urban and rural communities resulting in successes attributed to regional
state influenced planning.

Crisis Decision-Making
“You know, I’m really thankful for the tax incentives. So, I mean, you tell me
– what is the city going to do? We’re a million dollar business. What can the
city provide me that will help my business? We need help! Tax incentives are
nice, but these come after the fact. What assistance can I be provided right
now? We already started renovations – my whole roof came off my warehouse
– office – flooded. I’m repairing it – moved my office and I’m leasing next
door, but look at the block! Nobody’s coming back, no street lights. What do I
tell my women employees who gotta’ leave my building between dusk and dark
with no street lights on. There’s no where to eat lunch – nothing’s open. I had
a contract with Avondale Shipyard for five years. You know what they did?
Gave it to a company in Missouri!! – after the state of Louisiana gave them $50
million the year before. Remember that? Now you tell me! I gotta’ tell
ya’…I’m angry! What am I supposed to do? What is the city gonna’ do? I
love New Orleans, that’s why I’m here. Been here 75 yrs, minority owned.
I’ve heard what the feds gonna’ do. What’s the city gonna’ provide to stop me
from going to Jefferson parish, going to St. Charles?”… “tell you the truth, I
really need business.”
-New Orleanian CEO speaking with Executive Director of MOED

Decision-Making Theory
One of the most frightening, yet fascinating subjects in history are crises.
Unplanned, they occur suddenly, threaten vital interests, and raise enormous uncertainties
threatening the status quo, demanding quick decisions to be made by leaders under
intense pressure (Gilbert and Lauren 1980).

Most recent analytical studies of decision-making as well as historical accounts
indicate that a modern state is in no way a monolithic or unitary actor. As delineated by
Allison and Halperin, the process of decision making is comprised of multiple actors
representing several different individual officials and their constituencies with
bureaucratic positions and careers to protect and many organizations or groups with
varying interests, values, objectives, and interpretations of the national “interest” in given
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situations (Gilbert and Lauren 1980).

The actors referred to connote those elected

officials present at the local level in state legislatures during the bargaining process of the
GO Zone tax package for Louisiana.

Crisis management theory recognizes the importance of and complexity in
analyzing how decisions are made in a crisis domestically and internationally.
Bargaining occurs not only between states, but also within states or groups of states,
making the formation of conclusions about decision-making theories difficult. Different
conceptions of how governments make decisions aimed at different degrees of analysis
produce very different images of bargaining, how it is carried out, and what its chances
are for success (Gilbert and Lauren 1980).

There are varying ideologies regarding the purpose of managing and studying
crises. Many theorists concerned with crisis management concentrate their attention on
1)Changes in the composition of flexibility of contending alliances and alliance systems,
2) Systemic efforts by international organizations toward conflict resolution in interstate
security disputes, 3)The process or organizational context in which decisions are reached
during periods of intense crises, 4) Select aspects of bargaining during crisis management
5) Crisis management in regards to outcomes among participants as they bargain with
each other, 6) How decisions are made in a crisis, 7) To uncover defects in decision
makers that have been harmful in past crises (Gilbert and Lauren 1980). Several of the
listed study sequences pertain to crises which are not seen as opportunities at all, but as
disasters which if not managed could result in war. However, these ideologies are also
pertinent to the study of domestic public policy crises. As a result of many studies, the
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study of crisis management has become a “no man’s land sown with uncharted
minefields,” as described by one scholar, but it should be acknowledged that an
overwhelming number of studies are conducted pertaining to crises in times of potential
war threats (Bell 1971). Less attention is given to crises withstood by local governments
within states.

Model 1 Complete Problem Solver Model
In The Complete Problem Solver John Arnold provides what he has coined “A
Total System for Competitive Decision Making.” He initiates instruction on the methods
of successful decision making in competitive environments by posing the question, “How
do we create a future rather than merely cope with the future?” Analyzing the root causes
of the situation, options available, and decision risks are said by Arnold to greatly assist
organizations in having discussions during the decision making process that involve
argumentation and differences of opinion but simultaneously emphasize maintaining a
focused set of priorities (Arnold 1992).

The best decisions Arnold claims are those which more logically achieve the
satisfaction of the organization’s criteria, include values and feelings, and reduce risks to
an acceptable level. Beginning with Root Cause Analysis one of the most important
words in the problem solver’s lexicon is, “Why?” Understanding why things happen
allows the decision maker to move on to Steps 2 and 3: choosing your options and
assessing the risks, though “Time” is the primary enemy in competitive and/or crisis
environments and decisions must be made rather quickly. There are seven steps outlined
within this first step of analyzing root causes (Arnold 1992).
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Steps in Root Cause Analysis

1. Prioritize Initiatives
2. Define Problem or Opportunity, asking what is not happening that should be
happening, vice versa (general, observable, factual data)
3. Describe the Problem with a Three-Pronged Approach
-Give the situation an identity, asking who is involved, what products or services are
affected, which organizational departments are engaged
-Location, asking where is the crises
-Timing (identifying short and long term effects)
4. Distinguish What is from What is Not
5. Diagnose Obvious Factors Contributing to the Problem
6. Destroy the Hypothesis, asking questions that might possibly undermine the
hypothesis
7. Decide What to Do Next (determining the appropriate corrective or
opportunistic action)
Over time data gets lost or distorted, original issues get lost as the problem
transforms, feelings, emotions and opinions begin to infuse the crisis (Rashomon Effect).7
Many of these steps are taken by individuals and thus their organizations on a routine
basis throughout the day and thus are taken for granted. Breezing straight through root
cause analysis, typically skimming over the sixth step of destroying the hypothesis and
identifying other factors responsible for the problem’s existence leads many
organizations to jump right into the solution. It takes increased time to be practical and
follow a systematic method for solving problems and making decision then following
7

A by-word for any situation wherein the truth of an event becomes difficult to verify due to the conflicting
accounts of different witnesses.
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hunches and surface observations to arrive at a fast “result,” however rushing through
analyzing the condition’s root causes may lead to perpetual oversights in the decision’s
implementation phase, with the result, being the proposed decision not accomplishing its
objective to extinguish or ameliorate the present condition (Arnold 1992).

Steps in Option Analysis
1. Smoke out Issues, asking if decision is necessary
2. State Your Purpose, identifying solution net ingredients will make you more
likely to find a solution tailored to your needs
3. Set Criteria, identifying what you wish to achieve, preserve, and avoid
4. Set Priorities
5. Identify Options
6. Test Options Against Criteria
7. Troubleshoot and Refine Your Choice
Steps in Risk Analysis
1.
2.
3.
4.

Scan and Specify Potential Risks
Prioritize Risks
List Likely Causes of Failure
List Preventive Actions
Arnold points out that at the heart of Risk Analysis, performed during Option

Analysis is the simple, yet overlooked necessity to smoke out the issues and inquire as to
whether the decision being proposed is necessary. Tunnel vision is needed during the
process of analyzing options to narrow perceptions and limit risks of searching for new
and “newer” solutions, in effect wasting time and possibly losing influence. Identified
options/problem solutions are tested in Step 6 to ensure that proposed decisions do indeed
achieve, preserve, and/or avoid the overall purpose for the decision being stated in Step 2.
Troubleshooting and refining the organization’s winning decision allows for the solution
to be further improved after the decision’s election, and recognizes that having
organizations spot early on what can go wrong with the decision’s communication
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internally and externally through the organization and its effect on later implementation
of the decision must be kept in mind (Arnold 1992).

As mentioned before, smoking out the issues is highly important, yet treated
naïvely in the crisis decision making process. The more specifically you can identify
high-likelihood causes, the greater the chance your experience, know-how, and judgment
can help you make good decisions that will bring forth opportunities and results desired.
While smoking out the issues ask questions: Has something happened that should not
have, and therefore needs to be corrected or prevented in the future? Has something
happened better than expected? Has something not happened that you wish to happen?
Is something missing that needs to be provided?

In formal fashion, analyzing risks entails articulating what, where, and when.
Consciously spelling out what can go wrong, where it can go wrong, and when it can go
wrong alleviates threats of deciding upon an unfruitful decision built upon a poor
foundation that did not fully account for factors that could have destroyed the initial root
analysis hypotheses (Arnold 1992). Clearly identifying root causes first, systematically
analyzing available options secondly, and lastly moving toward making a decision with
the least risk presents a solution that is complete in its efforts to be effective in improving
conditions.

MOED’s mission and departmental goals post-Katrina remained the same, “To
Connect People and Businesses to Opportunities.” The departmental goals were 1) A
thriving and diverse New Orleans economy and 2) A well trained, diverse and highlypaid New Orleans workforce. Objectives targeted under these two goals fit the needs of

42

the times for New Orleans’ post-Karina economic climate. The diversion from the path
of finding the best way to achieve the first three bullets under Goal 1 (See Figure 2.0)
occurs in the decisions made for implementation.

The first three bullets were most pertinent to business recovery in the first four
months following Katrina up to January 1st and still are. These objectives initiate the plan
to bring back New Orleans businesses, provide access to contracting opportunities, and
provide access to financial assistance to retain New Orleans businesses. Had MOED
used a systematic approach to decision-making such as the process outlined by Arnold
the first step in forming a decision would have been analyzing the root causes for
businesses returning slowly or not at all and choosing to remain in neighboring parishes
and states. One of the primary root causes found would have been a lack of access to
capital. Neither the Renewal Community or GO Zone provide access to capital. These
initiatives assist businesses only when they are operational. MOED may have decided to
aggressively target the disbursement of increased Small Business Administration loans
(SBA). Secondly, if following a systematic problem-solving method MOED would have
looked at all of its options, recognized the federal government’s agenda to issue the GO
Zone and became an active voice, possibly influencing decision-makers to concentrate
provisions in most-needy communities.

Method 2 Prudential Practical Reasoning-Pluralist Exchange Model

Two ideologies on opposite ends of the decision-making spectrum have been well
researched through the contemporary study of public policy-making: elitist planning and
pluralist exchange. Advocates of elitist planning view collective decisions as deliberate
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choices from available options made by decision makers on behalf of another group.
Advocates of the pluralist exchange model regard collective decisions as epiphenomenal
outcomes as the result of reactive problem-solving, strategic planning and incremental
decisions made by individuals or groups interacting with one another. Found in both
paradigms is a standard criteria for evaluating policy options and making decisions based
on explicit knowledge and adoption of a set of valued objectives. Evaluation of the
outcome tests the extent to which policies effectively and efficiently achieve the set
objectives by either 1) minimizing the costs of attaining objectives, or 2) maximizing the
realization of values with given resources. Failure to meet prescribed criteria provides
reason for rejecting the decision. The process of setting criteria and rating its level of
effectiveness and efficiency is an instrumental concept of policy rationality and is the
dominant public policy model generally accepted (Manzer 1984).

When the legitimacy of a policy is judged against fundamental beliefs and
political principles on the community, and the responsiveness of a policy satisfying a
particular individual or the community as a whole, then substantive rationality is
appropriate to apply in evaluating a policy decision. Under the criteria of substantive
rationality a good reason for adopting a policy option would be that the policy is
considered “just” or “in the public interest.” If the policy does not meet these criteria
there would be grounds for rejecting the policy/decision (Manzer 1984).

Contemporary decision-making should be confronted with a concept of policy
rationality that takes both instrumental and substantive rationality into account and
weighs them equally.

David Gauthier’s analysis of practical reasoning has been
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influential in the development of the concept of substantive rationality. In simple terms,
Gauthier defines a practical problem as a problem about what to do. It is a problem that
arises in a particular set of circumstances which can not be overlooked in resolving the
issue. It confronts a person or a group whom constrain the potentials for action with their
attitudes and level of capacity. There is no formula provided for the theory of practical
reasoning (Gauthier 1963). Gauthier argues that words such as “ought,” “should” and
“best” guide the vocabulary and discourse of practical judgments. Practical judgments
guide action and outline what is best to do or what should be done, and are made through
deliberating the options provided and reasons for taking action.8

The reasons to justify a practical judgment involve both prudential and moral
considerations and are more like hypothetical imperatives than those decisions which are
categorical. Prudential reasoning highlights the desires, needs and aims of the agent.
Three basic statements comprise the prudential practical reasoning process. Statements
that:

1. Specify and rank the decision-maker’s preferences
2. Specify the context of decision-making (available options and potential benefits
and costs)
3. Specify actions to be taken
In no way does Gauthier attempt to make the method of practical reasoning a
“sure-catch-all-way” to solving all crises, but regards the process as a way in which to
arrive at the best decision recognizing that although attempting to reason “practically,”

8

Gauthier notes that practical judgments are action-guiding not action-determining. He hypothesizes that
very often we act on present desires or inclinations against what we know to be the reasonable course of
action.
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the decision-maker(s) is still operating within the realm of the uncertain. “One must look
before one leaps, but one must still leap”.9

Basic statements comprising prudential practical reasoning are similar to Edith
Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser’s framework for analyzing elitist-planning. In their
textbook, A Primer for Policy Analysis, the following steps towards successful decisionmaking are provided:

1. Establish the context of the public problem and objectives for perusal
2. Lay out alternative courses of action and possibilities for gathering further
information
3. Predict consequences of alternative actions, rating the outcomes
4. Take the best course of action
Scholars differentiate the two dominant paradigms of public decision-making as
pluralist-exchange models (reactive problem solving) predominately assuming prudential
reasoning (restricted to desires of agent), and elitist-planning models (anticipatory
planning) predominately assuming moral reasoning on the part of the decision makers.
Prudential reasoning in an elitist-planning model must bring the criterion of political
rationality into balance with economic and technical criteria. Decision makers must ask
vital political questions that influence a self-regarding mode of rationality. What will be
the impact of the decision maker’s policy is people are not persuaded to accept it? What
will be the impact of the decision maker’s policy if the price of gaining acceptance is
very high and resources are scarce? By necessity, decision makers may have to work
incrementally, continually assessing political costs against societal benefits and making
further adjustments (Stokey and Zeckhauser 1978).

9

Gauthier argues that only a practical judgment produced after limited deliberation is useful because the
time to deliberate is limited. Limited practical judgments still serves to explain or justify action.
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In Lindblom’s “market society” a skeptical view of human intellect is given.
Debate and bargaining processes are employed as interactive processes to take the place
of intellectual analysis. In a negative light, the market society is seen as one in which
decision makers do not think out their problems; they act them out. Decisions are highly
decentralized and disconnected causing large societal problems which are ameliorated
through by-products or epiphenomena of many individual or group decisions. The
market society takes an incremental approach to problem solving and fosters a trial and
error approach (Lindblom 1977).

This pluralist exchange process is also described as reactive problem-solving.
With the general motives of officials mixed, including power, income, prestige,
convenience, security, personal loyalty, pride in proficient performance of work, desire
to serve the public interest and commitment to a specific course of action, leaders in
general are depicted as making decisions grounded in self-interest. In pluralist exchange
models of public decision-making, prudential reasoning is a desirable norm. As noted by
Aaron Wildavsky, it is difficult enough for a decision maker to calculate how the
interests he/she is advocating might best be served, but even more difficult to perform
the same calculation for others who may be affected (Wildavsky 1964).

It can be argued that MOED actively sought to expand the pre-existing Renewal
Community of seven tracts to twenty tracts immediately realizing that it was an initiative
which could easily be reached, possibly helping the city “save face” in a suffering
business environment which it appeared to have little assistance to give.

The

department, the city, the state, and FEMA were all learning what roles they should play,
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who had the resources, and how to easily have access to them. When Mayor Nagin and
Governor Blanco announced the expansion of the Renewal Community in November
2005 it may have given hope to businesses that help was truly on the way, however once
realizing what the Renewal Community really provided (tax incentives) and realizing the
few businesses which actually qualified based on locale, business men and women grew
increasingly disgruntled and disappointed. They either weren’t in the twenty eligible
census tracts, but were one of the other one hundred sixty-seven or had lost everything
and had been told they were denied a SBA loan.

This decision was pluralist-exchange based being that is was highly reactive and
practical. However, whether the decision to amend the RC boundaries to twenty census
tracts was moral and acting in the public interest is arguable. Was the expansion in
company’s interest or simply a pacifier? Both.

Method 3 Antecedents of Groupthink Model

The theory of groupthink is considered to be one of the most cited contributions to
the study of decision making. Since the introduction of the theory in the early 70s the
core of the hypothesis for the groupthink model is that the existence of certain antecedent
conditions within groups of decision makers results in defective decision-making
processes, which in turn are highly likely to produce poor policy outcomes. The scholar
behind the theory, I.L. Janis hypothesized that information-processing errors, also
referred to as symptoms of defective decision making, are first preceded by several
different variables and are an important casual source of defective decision making.
Quite a major matter, it is during the stage prior to having to process information
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regarding crises that an organization establishes group norms, allows for a leadership
style to emerge and set precedents, and situational constraints materialize (1996).

Antecedent factors contributing to how an organization processes information
include such factors as: group structure, leadership style, and situational variables. These
antecedent conditions set the stage for effective or defective decision making. Therefore,
it is at this early stage that decision-making groups can adopt procedures intended to
avoid defective decision making (Schafer and Crichlow 1996).

Antecedents of Groupthink
1.
2.

Group Insulation
Lack of Tradition of
Impartial Leadership
3. Lack of Tradition of
Methodical Procedures
4. Group Homogeneity
5. Short Time Constraint
6. Recent Failure
7. High Personal Stress
8. Overestimation of the
Group
9. Closed Mindedness
10. Pressures Toward
Uniformity

Information Processing Errors
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Gross Omissions in Surveying Alternatives
Gross Omissions in Surveying Objectives
Failure to Examine Majors Costs & Risks of
Preferred Choice
Poor Information Search
Selective Bias in Processing
Failure to Reconsider Originally Rejected
Alternatives
Failure to Work Out Detailed Implementation,
Monitoring & Contingency Plans

Low
Probability
of
Favorable
Outcome

Derived from Janis in 1982 ten negative antecedents of groupthink are directly
linked to seven information processing errors resulting in a low probability of favorable
outcome. From a theoretical review Mark Shafer and Scott Crichlow refined a set of
operational definitions for the ten antecedent conditions.

1. Group insulation: Decision makers do not coordinate and communicate with
others outside the immediate decision-making circle. They isolate themselves
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from other bureaucrats, intelligence officers, diplomats, allies, and those on
location at the scene of the crisis, relying almost exclusively on members of its
own group for information and counsel.
2.

Lack of tradition of impartial leadership: The leader limits open discussion of a
wide range of alternatives, and has a history of making their positions clear or
giving the impression that he/she has predispositions.

3.

Lack of tradition of methodical procedures: The leader has not made a routine of
having information search teams, routine and systematic decision-making
meetings, and analysis of pros and cons.

4.

Group Homogeneity: A lack of disparity exists in the social background and
ideology of the members of the decision-making group.

5.

Perceived short time constraint: The group suffers under perceived temporal
limits that affect its ability to consider policy options fully.

6.

Low self-esteem caused by recent failure: Recent defeat weighs on the minds of
decision-making group and affects current decisions.

7.

High personal stress: Crises causes great anxiety because of both the stakes
involved and the perceived chances of success or unpleasant policy options.

8.

Overestimation of the group: Group operates in air of invulnerability

9.

Closed-mindedness: Group relies on stereotypes or guiding metaphors or
analogies.

10. Pressures toward uniformity: One or more of the following exist: self-

censorship, an illusion of unanimity, direct pressure on dissenters, self-appointed
mind guards.
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Janis notes that this condition is not situational bound but rather a general pattern
of behavior (1996). Connections between antecedent conditions and faulty decision
making in some cases appears anecdotal. In others, systematic statistical analysis
investigates 1) whether each individual antecedent condition is correlated with Herek’s
index of information-processing errors, 2) the cumulative effect of antecedent conditions
on the number of information-processing errors, 3) the direct effect of the antecedent’s
index on crises outcomes.

Faulty structural environments are seen as the primary factor in producing
unfavorable outcomes and are the effect of antecedent conditions on crisis outcomes. It
was hypothesized that a higher number of antecedent conditions results in a higher
number of information-processing errors by the decision-making group. Four of the ten
antecedent conditions were found to be related to information-processing errors in a
statistically significant manner through an individual bivariate analysis. These influential
antecedents are: lack of tradition of impartial leadership, lack of tradition of methodical
procedures, overestimation of the group, and closed mindedness. A fifth variable,
pressures toward uniformity, is close to being significant. The other six antecedents,
although identified as present in the study of select case studies, were not found to be
statistically significant (Schafer and Crichlow 1996).

The set of antecedent conditions clearly found to be correlated with informationprocessing errors in group decision making deal with leadership style (lack of tradition of
impartial leadership), group procedures (lack of tradition of methodical procedures), and
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patterns of group behavior (overestimation of the group, closed mindedness and pressures
toward uniformity) (Schafer and Crichlow 1996) .

An important policy-making implication of Shafer and Criflow’s hypothesis is
that if what matters in terms of the quality of the decision are the structural preconditions,
then focusing on the information-processing errors alone is misguided. By the time an
organization/decision-making group gets to the information-processing stage it is too late.
What matters to begin with is how the leader and decision-making group structurally
organize and regularly conduct themselves. Research findings do not necessarily suggest
that information-processing errors are unimportant. Instead, the processing errors are
classified as treatable symptoms of a problem that has earlier origins, namely in the
structural and behavioral environment of decision making.

As delineated in the dysfunctional organizational design of MOED, the proper
remedy presents itself as leaders and decision-making groups re-structure their
environment. Twenty-one employees with diverse work functions can not be grouped
into one category, “Team,” under one head, the director, and be expected to not incur
problems had through miscommunication. See Figure 2.0. Re-structuring the work
environment to one which develops patterns of impartial leadership and methodical
procedures and avoids overestimation of the group, closed-mindedness, and pressures
toward uniformity leads to better decisions and hence, successful outcomes. With these
characteristics of effective decision- making at play, fewer processing errors should
emerge, and outcomes may be more favorable.
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Decision-Making Model Analysis

When analyzing the three decision-making models in this text there are several
points found in each model present in MOED’s two primary decisions. This is the basis
for why the three models, complete problem solver, prudential practical reasoning, and
groupthink were selected for review and analysis of MOED’s organizational structure
and decision-making processes. Questions are raised surrounding local, state and federal
legislatures basis for deciding which parishes are entitled to provisions made in the GO
Zone, however the focus of this analysis is on an organizational unit operating on the
local level to achieve self-defined goals.

Model 1 Critique

Delineation of the three models shows that the Complete Problem Solver Model
provides the most detailed and outlined process for arriving at effective and efficient
decisions of the three models. It is a simple process laid out in plain language that can
assist organizations in acquiring desired outcomes.

However, there appears to be

overlaps found amongst the three forms of analysis: root cause, options, and risks. The
seven steps defined in chronological order in root cause analysis may not be the best
route provided for attempting to define a plan of execution and implementation. The
steps would prove to be more useful if arranged in the following manner.
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Arnold’s Root Cause Analysis
Procedure

Suggested Root Cause Procedure

1. Prioritize Initiatives

1. Describe Problem with 3-Pronged
Approach

2. Define Problem or Opportunity

2. Diagnose Obvious Factors
Contributing to Problem
3. Define Problem or Opportunity

3. Describe the Problem with 3Pronged
4. Distinguish What is From What is
Not

4. Distinguish What is From What Is

5. Diagnose Obvious Factors
Contributing to Problem

5. Destroy the Hypothesis

6. Destroy the Hypothesis
7. Decide What to Do Next

6. Prioritize Initiatives
7. Decide What to Do Next

Prioritizing initiatives is explained by Arnold as the process by which
organizations sequentially articulate what it is they would like to implement in order to
achieve a set goal. This step in the decision-making process should not be conducted
first. Giving the situation an identity by acknowledging who is involved and what is
affected, taking the situation’s location into account, and identifying the short and long
term effects of the crises should be done first. Step 4, Distinguishing What is From What
is Not, should remain in the same order, however, the remaining five steps should be
arranged as portrayed in the above chart. Identifying what is obviously causing the
problem second, compiling factual data for further insight into the crises, articulating a
general hypothesis and then attempting to undermine the hypothesis through high-level
questions, brainstorming potential initiatives to eradicate the crises, and then deciding on
what path to take after prioritizing those initiatives will lead to be a clearer, more
effective, and successful decision. Step 4, Distinguishing what the problem is from what
it is not is probably not needed, and an internal processing step taken when taking the
first step of describing the problem with a three-pronged approach.
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Arnold’s method gives the presumption that if followed in the order provided
organizations and decisions makers will indeed ultimately arrive at successful decisions.
His steps do not have to be followed “to a T” to arrive at a decision that actually caters to
outcomes desired. The steps found in option and risk analysis are necessary, but one
might find that they may have previously completed a step listed in these two areas of
analysis in the first analysis of root cause analysis.

Model 2 Critique

Advocates of the pluralist-exchange model acknowledge that decisions are often a
result of reactive problem-solving, strategic planning and incremental decisions.

A

detailed model is not provided for guiding a decision-maker through a process to arrive at
a successful decision as that found in the Complete Problem Solver, however a standard
criteria for evaluating policy options and making decisions is present. The specifics of
how to evaluate a policy/decision is simplified and judged based on the decision’s ability
to achieve the set goal. Manzer’s ideology that a decision is viewed as successful if it is
seen as effective and efficient is very business-like in manner. An efficient decision is
defined as one which minimizes the costs of attaining objectives. An effective decision is
defined as one which maximizes the realization of values or priorities with given
resources. This type of evaluation of a decision may not truly capture the full degree to
which an actual process is needed systematically ensure that all factors influencing the
situation, all options with their identified risk levels are considered. So, although the
evaluation of good decision is stated rather plainly, the process by which to best arrive at
the efficient and effective decision is not provided.
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Evaluating a decision through the realm of substantive rationality is also useful,
but just as all decisions can not be viewed as successful solely based on their level of
effectiveness and efficiency, neither can a decision viewed solely as “just” and in the
“public interest” be considered successful. Other attributes of a good decision must be
present.

As Gauthier points out, the reasons to justify a practical decision should

encumber both prudential and moral considerations. This is to say that the desires of the
decision maker as well as the proposed decision should work together to implement what
is in the public interest.

Of particular appreciation is Gauthier’s acknowledgment that decisions are made
within the realm of the uncertain. There are often multiple decisions on the table to
choose from. The goal is to choose the best decision comprised of suggestions detailing
what should and ought to be initiated. Acting out the best decision in an incremental
fashion is realistically the only way to determine the success of a decision, and allows for
alterations to be made along the way throughout implementation. This method however
is seen by Lindblom in his “market society” as something not to be modeled. Yet, in all
decisions that are made it should be acknowledged that it is only through trial and error
that the decision can truly proven to be effective and efficient. This step of the process
could be added to Arnold’s Complete Problem Solver Model which ends with simply
deciding what to do next. A “complete” process would include acknowledging that after
the best decision has been made and implemented, alterations may still be needed.
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Model 3 Critique

In the former two models focused is given to the process by which an
organization should arrive at the best decision for execution taking into account both
prudential and moral reasoning. The third model, antecedents of groupthink, was elected
because of its emphasis placed on negative factors which effect organizational structure,
information processes resulting in defective decision making.

Crises management hypotheses like most hypotheses in general have value
judgments attached to them. One premise pertinent to the study of crises is that crises are
largely bad and those which are mismanaged worse. Evaluating decisions chosen by the
Mayor’s Office of Economic Development without utilizing a model founded in
analyzing factors contributing to decisions which are defective would be overlooking a
useful method of assessment.

Janis’ hypothesis that information-processing errors are preceded by several
variables which are important casual sources of making poor decisions adds further
understanding and steps toward arriving at the best decision. All of his ten antecedents of
the groupthink model were not empirically proven to be statistically significant, but each
was found present in several case studies analyzed by Janis, and should remain included
in the list of antecedents to be aware of. It is averred through his study that far previous
to an organization sitting down to decide the best plan of action, a leadership style has
emerged, group norms have been established, and organizational constraints have been
identified and accepted.
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Definitions provided by Shafer and Crichlow are useful and only the first
antecedent seems to not take the full implication of its title into account.

“Group

insulation” which is the first antecedent listed notes that having a group of decision
makers isolate themselves from others in government or in some involved with the
situation at hand contributes to arriving at poor decisions. What should have also been
included in this definition is the negative impact presented when collective decisionmakers only focus on their own agenda, only half recognizing the agenda of others or not
at all. It is possible that this trait is included by the scholars under Closed Mindedness.

Faulty structural environments are seen as the primary factor in producing
unfavorable outcomes and are the effect of negative antecedent conditions on crisis
management. The structural environment is molded by the organization’s leaders and
thus emphasis is rightfully placed on how the leader develops and facilitates decisionmaking groups and their discourse and process for analyzing the crisis. Overall, this
model hits the target in assessing factors contributing to defective decisions and should
always be considered by local governmental leaders when directing organizations
through times of normalcy, doing so automatically feeds into the establishment of
departmental norms and will more likely be adhered to during times of crises.

As said previously, it can be inferred that norms set pre-crisis are carried through
during times of crisis. Departmental norms had in MOED are not an exception to the
rule. If there is a lack of leadership impartiality or a lack of methodical procedures for
arriving at decisions for implementation, it is very difficult to establish new antecedents
as norms during a time of crisis with less resources and time.
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Lessons for MOED in Crisis Decision-Making

Eight months following Hurricane Katrina business recovery in New Orleans is
still dismal, yet steady. The unemployment rate of workers still displaced by Katrina
jumped to nearly 35% in May, a 54% increase since April. Louisiana’s labor force has
shrunk every month since November, and is now 12% smaller than it was in July 2005, a
month before the landfall of Katrina. Nearly one in three of the working age adults still
displaced by Katrina are still out of a job. The proportion of utility customers using
services again in New Orleans has increased from about 50% in March to 60% in April.
Only one in five public schools are open, however the re-opening of two elementary
schools and one high school is indicative that families are returning to the city. Marking
the steady return of the tourism and hospitality industry, hotels and bed and breakfasts
continue to re-open in the metro area. 64% of bed and breakfasts have re-opened, and
60% of the hotels (Liu, Fellowes, and Mabanta May 2006). Of the 8,560 businesses in
New Orleans pre-Katrina, approximately 1,800 of them have been able to re-open
(Census Bureau 2003).

Of the various ideologies for studying the purpose and management of crises there
are two pertinent concentrations of study which correlate well with those decisions
chosen by the Mayor’s Office of Economic Development. These studies concentrate on
1) The purpose or organizational context in which decisions are reached during periods of
intense crises and 2) How decisions are made in a crises (Brecher 1977; Allison 1971).
There are three decisions which are questionable for possibly not having achieved desired
outcomes. These questions are: MOED’s decision to 1) Pursue amending legislation to
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expand Renewal Community boundaries to include the entire City of New Orleans. 2)
To consciously or unconsciously overlook early intermediary legislative discussion and
processes for the inauguration of GO Zone legislation. What is also questioned in this
text, but is only of tertiary focus is the reasoning behind state legislatures working with
the U.S. Congress to include all thirty-one parishes classified as “core disaster areas” in
the Gulf Opportunity Zone (GO Zone).

Devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina has won this storm the number one spot
for being the worst natural disaster ever recorded in this nation. Although, many would
say that that the devastation caused by this storm was not natural at all, but of man-made
nonfeasance, it should be expected that any governmental entity tackling new and
uncharted dilemmas will stumble, miss opportunities, choose half-baked decisions, and
thus perform sub-optimally. Katrina has shown the world how little prepared the United
States is in dealing with domestic threats and catastrophes, whether looking at the slow
reaction time of FEMA, the inflexibility and high standards of SBA low-interest loans, or
over-issuing of financial assistance from Red Cross.10 MOED has not proven itself to be
any different from state and federal governmental entities to perform outside the realm of
mismanagement and mere mistakes.

The Mayor’s Office of Economic Development was faced with two challenges.
The challenge of working with a staff that was cut in half, from fifty-four employees,
down to twenty-two on a reduced budget. The job of each employee of course was
10

See Hope Yen (2006, March). FEMA Mismanaged Katrina Recovery Effort, GAO Says. Washington
Post. Retrieved May 29, 2006, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/03/16/AR2006031602154.html Also see (2006), March). Statement: American
Red Cross Currently Investigating Allegations. Retrieved May 29, 2006 from
http://www.redcross.org/pressrelease
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multiplied, yet the resources were depleting.

Under normal circumstances an

organization faced with the challenge of downsizing and re-stabilizing its organization is
given a minimum of six months to organize, set new precedents, and again focus on
achieving set outcomes.

MOED was given a month, resulting in those necessary

interrelated strategies such as helping the organization to focus on a new clearly
illustrated future, encouraging new thinking, and flattening organizational structures by
consolidating administrative positions while widening the span of control (Benest 2005).
These necessary strategies to reshape processes, precedents, and protocol in MOED were
possibly omitted, and carried forward negative antecedents which resulted in defective
decision-making.

The antecedents of the groupthink model as described by Janis were highly
influential in setting MOED on the path of pursuing the expansion of the Renewal
Community throughout the City of New Orleans. Those antecedents most evident in the
organization’s structure are group insulation, lack of tradition of impartial leadership,
lack of tradition of methodical procedures, perceived short time constraint, high-personal
stress, and closed-mindedness. Lack of tradition of impartial leadership, lack of tradition
of methodical procedures, and consolidation of administrative positions while widening
the span of control (noted earlier) are illustrated in MOED’s “Staff Presentation.” See
Figure 2.0. Notice the hierarchy of organizational structure. It does not clearly define
protocol, a process for decision-making, and hints at the possibility of many bottle-necks
in not only decision-making, but implementation.
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The other antecedents of MOED’s information processing errors are found in
MOED’s decision to pursue expansion of the RC without making itself privy to those
conversations regarding business recovery at the state and federal level. In the pursuit of
achieving its own agenda MOED isolated itself and did not become involved with the
federal and state agenda to include thirty-one parishes in the GO Zone until the
communication and process of passing the legislation was complete. By then it was too
late.

It is from these findings that MOED is encouraged to 1. Review its antecedents of
group think and work towards improving its organizational and communication processes
internally. 2. Using Arnold’s Complete Problem Solver Model or a decision-making
model very similar begin to consistently implement a step-by-step process for arriving at
what Gauthier considers to be the “best” decision/plan of action, and 3. Keep in mind
that while working towards providing effective and efficient public policy, prudential
practical reasoning should be deliberate, yet not neglect moral reasoning. Decisions must
be made timely with the public’s interest in incremental fashion to allow for flexibility if
needed.

Had MOED asked pointed questions noted in the Complete Problem Solver
Model the organization may have never pursued expanding the Renewal Community
until after communicating with the state and federal government and having input in the
writing of the GO Zone legislation. Priorities post-Katrina would have changed. Months
before Katrina MOED was in discussion with HUD to expand the RC to include thirteen
additional census tracts. This was a Pre-Katrina agenda that MOED followed up on
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immediately following the hurricane and re-locating its operations back into New
Orleans, but based on MOED’s outcomes should not have been the first initiative to
address.

Had MOED taken time to re-organize, assess departmental goals, and truly
identify root causes, options and risks, deciding to have legislation regarding the Renewal
Community amended may have become a second priority, not a first. MOED may have
prioritized objectives to accomplish such by first working with HUD to request the
expansion of the RC based on HUD’s current guidelines, widening the boundaries to
include twenty census tracts, and then working with the state legislature to amend the RC
legislation congressionally to allow for “the most recent census data” to be used for
eligibility in acquiring increased census tracts throughout the city.

Hypotheses concerning crisis management, unlike conventional scientific
statements are imperatives seen as “recipes for action.”

The objective of crisis

management that stands out pertaining to the inauguration of the GO Zone is the zerosum situation in game theory - gain for one side is by definition a lost for the other. With
every “extra” parish unnecessarily included in the GO Zone’s boundaries, a loss can be
attributed to that “extra” parish’s inclusion in the legislation for lessening the appeal of
investment in more affected areas. A hypothesis regarding the GO Zone would be that
the GO Zone is merely maintaining the status quo. Those businesses which can do – do.
Those businesses save. Those which can not do – don’t. “If you can make it on your
own, then we, the federal government, will give you a kick back, a reward for your hard
work.” Since this is the case, and this is pretty much what incentives ultimately do, then
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MOED should have taken an active role in the politics behind this legislation’s
inauguration as a primary actor.

Conclusion

In the end the City of New Orleans is possibly not attracting the level of
investment that it could had it not had to compete with so many parishes within the state.
Furthermore, the expansion of the RC to include the entire city has not yet been passed.
These two conditions only aggravate the notion that MOED has accomplished little in
assisting the business recovery effort. What businesses are craving are loans, not tax
incentives.

While MOED canvassed the city and held workshops regarding tax

incentives, businesses lacked what they truly need assistance with: quick financing and
easy access to low-interest loans and seed capital.

Several antecedents influenced the department’s organizational structure thus
increasing information processing errors, resulting in unfavorable outcomes. Questions
posed during option analysis articulated in the Complete Problem Solver may have
avoided this waste of time and energy. Have we “smoked out the issues?” “What is our
problem?” Businesses are in need of financing. “Is expanding the RC going to remedy
this dilemma?” The answer would have been “No.” Give the problem an identity –
“Who is involved?”

The state and federal government.

“What are they trying to

accomplish?” They are more than likely going to quickly pass the GO Zone. “What are
the details of this legislation?”- gathering increased data. “This does not help New
Orleans. It increases interstate competition when we are already disadvantaged. What
are our options? What are our risks? Here is our plan of action.”
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MOED worked incrementally towards arriving at a decision using prudential
practical reasoning, placing its desires at the forefront. The drawback to this was the
desired outcome being hard to come by because the real dilemma of businesses not
having working capital was overshadowed by initiatives had by MOED pre-Katrina.
Working in isolation, lacking a tradition of impartial leadership and methodical
procedures, having a perceived short time constraint, high-personal stress amongst
decision-makers, and closed-mindedness worked against MOED being able to not only
achieve its agenda of expanding RC boundaries to include the entire city, but also led
MOED to being a non-participant in a decision-making process that they could have been
successful in, the inauguration of the GO Zone. Neither initiative is proving to be
“renewing the community.” Whether the GO Zone is filled with “pork” and given to
parishes not in need of the provisions given should be studied further. A suggestion
would be to extend the GO Zone deadline for parishes found to have incurred
catastrophic damage for an additional three years, ending in 2011. As for now the postKatrina status-quo for New Orleans has been maintained and predictions of whether
President Bush’s promise that “our job and our goal for the Gulf Coast was not to
survive, but to thrive, and just to cope, but to overcome” is sketchy.
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